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Introduction: a new geopolitics for
learning?
One of the most provocative ideas to emerge in recent
years has been Alan Scott’s (2001) central claim that a
new meta-geography of global city-regions is steadily
coalescing in the world. Exactly what Scott means by this
notion of the city-region is still elusive, though. As far as
I know, we do not yet possess a comprehensive typology
of its multiple and surely fast-mutating spatialities. The
concept seems to apply to dozens of urban areas impacted
quite differently by globalization: viz. to the intra-national
urban networks of Greater Zurich or the Randstad (Sassen,
2001); to the inter-national networks of the Yellow Sea
Cooperation Zone (Friedmann, 2001); and finally to the
“areal city-regions” of Cape Town and Puget Sound, each
relatively contiguous, if highly uneven, physical fields of
roughly three million people that occupy my central attention later in this paper.
Despite this ambiguity, Scott’s central claim is fascinating
because it amounts to a new and potentially radical geopolitics capable, at least in theory, of nurturing a number
of important projects (cf. Agnew 2002). Most profoundly,
if for the moment least likely in the post-9/11 era, a
global future progressively characterized and motored by
city-regions might actually offer something liberating to
those sceptical of, hostile to, or suffering from, the putative benefits associated with membership in the territorial
(i.e. genetically Western) state, which arguably has worked
rather poorly in a majority of those zones upon which it
has been aggressively grafted (including much of Africa
and the Middle East) [Footnote 1].

ception of a core-periphery hierarchy à la world systems
theory with a flatter geography of imminent, experimenting, city-regions, he also challenges the spatial direction of
learning. Instead of a world where an “advanced” North –
ahead in time and thus ahead in space – teaches through
diffusion a “trailing” South, Scott’s geopolitics suggest that
lessons can, should and increasingly will come from most
anywhere. On this reading, “Southern” city-regions like
Cape Town might actually have lots of lessons to teach
“Northern” city-regions like Puget Sound, if only we can
adopt an analytical posture that suggests such a developmental possibility for urban learning. This is not to argue
that the reverse is no longer true. One need only consider,
for example, urban South Africa’s rather frenzied interest in
Business Improvement Districts (originally a Canadian idea
that like basketball the Americans re-engineered, picked
up and ran with). But it does suggest that we spend much
more time thinking about the distinctive modernities and
institutional experimentations of the erstwhile South, especially where these emerge in urbanized spaces – long the
epicentres of “newness” in the world (Jacobs 1969).
This is my main intention here. I ultimately interrogate the
post-apartheid era in Cape Town (1994-2000) in terms of
the local governance lessons this era might have for the
contemporary institutional situation in “Puget Sound,” a
city-region that is quite literally at the opposite end of the
world but that, nonetheless, shares some commonalities
with Cape Town. However, before I discuss Puget Sound
and Cape Town in the main body of the paper I first lay
out the idea(1) of the city-region, focusing in particular
on the re-scaling of politics that this new spatial formation
seems to suggest.

But there is also a more immediate project opened up by
Scott’s geopolitical imagination – one that I wish to reference here at the outset. By challenging our older con-
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Theoretical considerations: city-regions
and the “re-scaling” of politics?
The consolidation of the (European) nation-state undoubtedly constitutes one of the crucial developments
in world history. Like many developments, though, some
now believe that the nation-state carries within itself the
strange logic of its own demise. In particular, the global
world that nation-states have helped to occasion over the

[Footnote 1]
Here the reader might also consider the interesting essay on
global city-regions by one of North America’s more unusual
politicians, the Canadian separatist Lucien Bouchard (2001),
who sees this concept from the perspective on an aspiring (urban) Quebec.

past several decades may be, paradoxically, “hollowing
out” these same states (Guéhenno 1995) This is true for
even powerful nation-states like the USA, whose neo-lib-

tions of polycentricity turn out to be rather diverse.” Map-

eral rationalities have actively legitimated and normalized

ping “polycentricity” – getting a sense of its “emerging

this process. In particular, the rise of supra-national insti-

forms” (Simmons and Hack 2000) -- is complex because,

tutions, especially the EU, has led a number of authors

amongst other things, “polycentricity” means different

to re-consider the actual and potential relevance of new

things to different people. It is economic and physical, but

scales for effective governance, social regulation and

also cultural, social and political. This creates the need

political identity. On this reading, new “post-national”

for cross-disciplinary research and collaboration, which is

geographies of various kinds are slowly emerging – and

easier said than done (Kloosterman and Musterd 2001).

more than that should emerge (Omae 1995).
As a result, there is no single “Chicago-like” map that
The “city-region,” forged mainly out of the economic

essentializes the city-region. But there is arguably a meta-

benefits associated with specialized, post-Fordist, indus-

logic or at least a rough grammar to these new spatial

trial clustering (viz. increasing returns to scale, untraded

formations, which like Latin syntax can spawn a myriad of

interdependencies; trust; and so on), is one such geog-

different manifestations, a “family resemblance” of ur-

raphy (Storper and Scott 1986); (Gordon and McCann

ban landscapes. In charting the differences between the

2000). Again, Alan Scott has been especially assertive in

global city and the global city-region, for example, Peter

drawing theoretical attention to the economic importance

(Hall 2001) identifies six seminal spaces, though many of

of city-regions, particularly those he considers “global”;

these do not apply to Kinshasa or Puket: (1) the traditional

but he is not alone. A fresh literature on “polycentric

downtown center, increasingly embellished to accommo-

urban regions” (PUR) highlights similar themes, even as

date global tourism and cultural activities; (2) the newer

most PUR authors acknowledge the importance of earlier

business centers of the service economy, often appearing

work by Jean (Gottman 1961), Alan (Pred 1977) and

in older residential areas; (3) the “internal” edge city, such

(Friedmann and Miller 1965) that relates to what the lat-

as London Docklands or La Défence in Paris; (4) the “ex-

ter authors dubbed “the urban field.”

ternal edge city,” frequently located near major transporta-

PUR scholars move beyond the mono-centric models of
industrial (sub-) urbanization. However, as (Kloosterman
and Musterd 2001) observe, “…concrete operationalisa-
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tion infrastructures; (5) the “outermost” edge city complex
for back-offices; and (6) specialized (sub)centers, including
rehabilitated zones for education, sports or theatre.
Extending his earlier work, John Friedmann (2002) takes

[Footnote 2]

this analysis even further. He draws on the scholarship of

In one of the few treatises on neoliberalism at the urban scale,
Brenner and Theodore add several other “rules,” many of
which do not emanate with urban elites per se: e.g. dismantling of central government support for municipal activities;
decentralization of welfarist responsibilities; creation of special
revenue collection districts, etc. (p. 369)

Klaus Kunzmann to chart an emerging “spatial structure of
the European city-region in the 1990s.” This spatial structure includes many of the nodes identified by Hall, albeit
with different names, but also a host of other contemporary realms, including “urban backwater space,” which
suggests a disarticulated “field” more than an articulated
“node.” Friedmann’s mapping exercise is particularly use-

(see also Friedmann 1992). Interestingly, he calls this the

ful for my purposes here because it is embedded within a

“quasi city-state” model, a neo-anarchistic term whose

larger analysis of governance. For Friedmann, the “pros-

bloodlines bind friedmann’s politics to the earlier idea(l)s

pect of cities” – and here he means all cities – depends

of lewis mumford and patrick geddes, of which more in a

crucially on the strategic decisions that actors make in

moment. For friedman, the “relatively autonomous quasi-

regards to urban development, i.e. on the politics of city-

city-state” provides a much more effective model for the

regions. Two models are available.

governance of city-regions because just development – my
term, not his -- is necessarily (1) endogenous (2) collab-

One the one hand, Friedmann argues, strategies may fol-

orative and (3) sustainable (p. 23-25). While the sustain-

low a “city-marketing” model. Here urban development

ability mantra may not stimulate much disagreement, the

per se is taken to be exogenous in origin and thus neces-

first two are more controversial.

sarily focused on attracting external capital, which will (in
theory) maximize economic growth and eventually cascade

There are two main reasons why. First, endogenous and

down through society via enhanced local job creation. As

collaborative development implies that city-regions are, as

Friedmann puts it: “[b]ecause there is only so much global

Friedmann puts it, “collective actors” (cf. Tilley 1974). This

capital to go around…if your city doesn’t latch on to it,

may under-estimate the class, gender and race cleavages

some other city will: city-marketing is a zero-sum game”

within city-regions even as it over-estimates the possibili-

(p. 21). The “rules” of this game are familiar -- wage

ties of placed-based community of any kind, much less

suppression; labor force compliance; streamlined local

a progressive community. This leads to a second main

administration; tax breaks; subsidized land -- and indeed

concern with Friedmann’s preferred model: it tends to reify

help to produce the “nodes” and “fields” just outlined.

a sense of “the urban” as a bounded “object” that can be

More, the power base is often shockingly narrow and

managed by “relatively autonomous” local actors. As Ash

anti-democratic: a tight alliance of trans-national busi-

Amin (2002) puts it: the globalizing city(region) is increas-

ness elites and city government officials. In simple terms:

ingly “unbounded”; it is not an object per se, but a set of

neoliberalism at the urban scale (Brenner and Theodore
2002). [Footnote 2]
In contrast, friedmann argues, there is an alternative,
much more progressive, strategy for urban development
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relationships that stretch from, through, and often well be-

(Bianco 2001) shows, it was Portland’s belated “rediscov-

yond “the city” as a poly-nucleated physical “thing.” Here

ery” of Mumford’s (invited) recommendations for regional

the city(region) is not a “field” but a “topology,” or more

growth and development in 1938 that partly explains its

properly, a thousand topologies winding their way through

contemporary reputation for progressive urbanization and

the everyday performances that hew out the mutable

environmental stewardship (Development 2000). Central

urban. The topology metaphor, drawn from actor-network

to this reputation is Portland’s strong political architecture

theory, suggests a relational (stretched) rather than relative

of regionalism, expressed through “Metro,” a regional

(nested) conceptualization of scale. In my view, there is

governing and planning institution responsible for services

much to recommend this particular conceptualization; it is

to 1.3 million residents in three counties and 24 cities,

often useful to think of scale in terms of “stretching” lines

including planning services and land-use information for

of force rather than nested containers of objects. However,

local governments; prioritization and allocation of federal

there are serious weaknesses as well: the topology of the

and state transportation funds; and business licence co-

actor-network in particular gives us only a vague sense of

ordination. Importantly, Metro has a constituent model of

politics and normative ethics. Actor-networks often tell us

governance: citizens are directly represented by an elected

what is happening, but not always what is to de done.

Council and Executive Director, which gives the body institutional teeth and constitutes a place-specific accumula-

For all its faults, then, Friedmann’s politics are compelling

tion of social capital (Abbot and Abbot 2003).

because they are tied to an older, if too often neglected,
tradition in geography and planning: neo-anarchism and

Portland aside, the practical importance of a coopera-

eco-regional planning. Friedmann’s elevation of “sustain-

tive, sustainable, regionalist approach to Friedmann’s

ability” in his urban development triptych – his emphasis

“quasi city-state” model lies in the proposition that it offers

on the foundational notion of wealth creation through

a plausible strategy for dealing with the most pressing

local-natural as opposed to external- financial capital

political challenges of today’s city-regions. According to

– does not draw explicitly on Mumford or Geddes, but

(Warner and Hefetz 2002): 70) these challenges are “…

the traces of this particular lineage are strong, particu-

competitive and overlapping local governments, whose

larly in Friedmann’s radical interpretation of “planning.”

political boundaries reflect historical patterns but no

Though planning today has a rather technical and nar-

longer coincide with the social, economic and ecologi-

row meaning, it was not always thus. As (Luccarelli 1995)

cal boundaries of the metropolitan area.” In the main,

documents, Mumford developed Geddes’ hypothesis that

regional consolidation of institutional identities – i.e. the

“evolution” (what we would today call “social learning”)

re-scaling of administrative systems to cohere with extant

occurs through rolling civic participation in the “survey” of

economic space (Bennett 2002) – promises more effective

a region’s resources, possibilities, mythical places, symbol-

management of key urbanization issues: sprawl, ecologi-

ic zones (what Lefebvre (1991) later called the representa-

cal disintegration, uneven fiscal capacity and concentrated

tional space of radical possibility).

poverty (Erkip 2000). Of course public choice theorists
challenge these apparently intuitive claims, arguing that

It is a mistake to dismiss this Geddes-Mumford tradition

market-based solutions improve implementation efficien-

as unworkable in today’s worlds. It informs Pierre Clavel’s
(Clavel 1985) analysis of the American “progressive city”
phenomena from 1969 to 1984. Further, as Martha
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cies through service privatisation and/or through inter-

Here regional identity emerges through an induced re-

municipal cooperation (the creation of “public markets”).

scaling of the political imagination -- through what Lefe-

Yet even if “private” and “public” markets do improve

bvre (1991) theorized as the dominant “moment” in the

service efficiencies, contract oversight by public authorities

production and stabilization of new spaces: the act of

may mitigate much of these gains. Worse, as (Warner and

representation itself.

Hefetz 2002) show, market approaches do not build equity
and voice. “Markets,” in other words, “do not build com-

Following Friedmann, then, city-regions possess embryonic

munity” (p. 84).

potential for “collective action” whilst political regionalism
is the preferred way to unlock this potential (cf. (Calthorpe

“Community” is simply a relational effect of shared identi-

and Fulton 2001). But the dangers are everywhere. “Re-

ties, including city-regional identities. It is important to note

gionalism” per se can slip quickly into corporate-based

that Marxists prefer “consciousness” to “identity” as the

boosterism rather than civic-driven participation, as

former suggests the putative priority of class relations in the

Philadelphia in the 1990s seems to show. In fin-de-siècle

political economy of urbanization. And certainly “class”

Philadelphia, “city-marketing” targeted capital accumula-

is crucial in the formation of political loyalties and social

tion in (Peter Hall’s) city-regional “nodes”; endogenous

affinities; but it often merges with a host of other claims on

efforts that targeted (John Friedmann’s) “urban backwater”

human beings, including gender, race and place-based

were conspicuously absent. As one businesswoman bluntly

claims (Cooke 1985). Within this context, it is plausible

put it: “Regionalism is not about inner-city guilt or helping

to argue that the successful formation of a city-regional

the poor. It is about being able to compete in the world”

identity is a crucial pre-condition to the collaborative

(Hodos 2002): 372). Accordingly, it is not just the pres-

(though not necessarily conflict-free) politics of Friedmann’s

ence of re-scaled institutions and identities that matters,

quasi-city-state. But how does this happen? Where does

but the constitution and objectives of these institutions and

such an identity come from? In one sense, these questions

identities, a point made quite eloquently by (Pastor and al.

seem well beyond the parameters of a conference paper.

2000) in their analysis of “regions that work.”

But in another sense, they are straightforward. They come
from simply getting on with things! In their recent analysis

To recapitulate this theoretical discussion before moving

of the relationship between “regional identity” and the stra-

on, then, the global emergence of polycentric “city-re-

tegic management and governance of PURs, (van Houtum

gions” – now full of heterogeneous spaces -- suggests new

and Lagendijk 2001) getting on with things is fundamen-

governance opportunities in the coming decades, opportu-

tally dialectical:

nities which arguably require a fundamental re-scaling of

PURs develop and position themselves through a process

our political capabilities in the service of a more cohesive

of regional identification, in which labelling (‘Randstad’,

city-regional identity. Following Friedmann’s analysis, two

‘Flemish Diamond’) and the setting of common images,

main models are available. The first model is unapologeti-

perspectives and goals play an essential role. […] A re-

cally neoliberal and – for this reason – cannot possibly

gion will have its own identity if it is different from others in

promote just urban development (Cox and Watt 2002).

terms of its politically induced strategic plans, its believed

The second model, rooted in the radical “planning” tradi-

or produced cultural assets [as well as] its functional/morphological dimensions (p. 752).
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tions of Geddes and Mumford, argues for an endogenous,

rapidly changing world economy. […] And technology

collaborative and sustainable agenda. Such an alternative

employment is

approach, however precarious and neo-utopian, hypothet-

scape. Employment in high technology is scattered

ically forges an organic sense of place-based identity – a

throughout the region’s four counties, ignoring county

regional community for participatory urban development

and city lines and establishing

and planning. With all this in mind, then, we might fruitfully

presence (Council 1999).

rapidly changing the region’s land-

a truly regional

explore the geography and governance experiences of two
city-regions at the opposite ends of the world: Puget Sound
and Cape Town – eventually interrogating how the former
might learn from the latter as both search for new urban
development strategies.

Post-Fordist Puget Sound: urban geographies and governance
Located in the majestic Pacific Northwest, between the
Cascade and Olympic mountains, “Puget Sound” has
evolved in recent years into a “city-region”, albeit one
forged from the steady conurbation of three, historically
distinct, “cities”: Seattle, Tacoma and Everett (Moudon and
Heckmann 2000). Like Cape Town, Puget Sound is home
to some three million people. This population constitutes
60% of the state’s overall population and is predominantly
white. That said, like other urban places in America, Puget
Sound has sizable populations of Latinos, African-Americans and Asians. The region awkwardly spans four counties and seventy odd incorporated municipalities.
To outsiders, “Puget Sound” – and particularly SeattleRedmond, where Bill Gates lives -- has an overwhelmingly
“high-tech” geography. There is good reason for this:
from 1995 to 1998, at the zenith of the New Economy,
local high-tech employment grew twice as fast as the
national rate (11.2% to 5.3% per annum, respectively).
Following (Warner and Hefetz 2002), though, this rapid
growth produced an economic reality sharply at odds with
the slower-moving cultural and political institutions of the

Adding Microsoft, Amazon, Adobe, Starbucks, and
new biotech companies, amongst others, to the
famous “Boeing base” – which produced two-thirds
of the world’s large commercial aircraft in the late
1990s (Unknown 1997) – has generated rapid demographic growth (3% more people in the region
per annum in recent years). Along with sprawl, this
has generated demands for new kinds of commercial,
cultural, retail and environmental amenities. Seattle’s
CBD, for example, has maintained about 35% of the
city’s jobs (unusually high for US cities), although the
wider space-economy has also produced plenty of
“edge space”, including Bellevue, which neatly fits the
“Edge City” syntax originally identified by Joel (Garreau 1991). Still other spatial transformations of note
include the re-engineering of downtown Tacoma, an
older industrial port city in the Southern part of the
region. In the late 1990s, Tacoma invested a billion
dollars of public and private money. Significant projects have included a branch campus of the University
of Washington, a waterfront esplanade, two major art
museums, a light-rail line, new condo/apartments,
and a convention center/hotel complex – a “cultureled”/”leisure space” strategy of urban renewal many
US downtowns have tried in recent years (Strom
2002).
The high-tech luster has faded somewhat in the current
economy, although the writing was already on the wall
before 9/11. In March 2001, for example, Boeing an-

region, of which more below. As one report put it:
High tech employment is [now the] major force in
establishing the region as a global

center in a

8

nounced that it would relocate its corporate headquarters

are three major signs that things are not as rosy as all this

to Chicago, sending fears that aerospace jobs -- and their

suggests.

3.14 multiple effect -- would follow in the coming years.
The “Boeing bomb” was widely interpreted as a wake-up

First, despite the comprehensive planning mandate, gover-

call, particularly in the popular press. The region, it is in-

nance relationships between municipals and counties and

creasingly suggested, can no longer take itself for granted.

as well as between municipalities within and across coun-

In particular, problems associated with rapid, post-Fordist

ties remains competitive rather than broadly collabora-

urbanization – especially transportation chaos – are con-

tive. Part of this relates to classic land-use politics: in one

sidered potential “death-blow” challenges. Recent articles

ex-urban case, for example, a lengthy community planning

in the mainstream press compare Seattle/Puget Sound

process was nearly torpedoed by the Master Builders As-

negatively with Vancouver and Portland. As one reporter

sociation. A more significant factor, though, is the uncom-

commented:

fortable new political culture of scale, i.e. of simultane-

With our Space Needle and sports teams, Pike Place

ously nesting and cross-linking “community plans” into the

Market and gorgeous geography, Boeing and Micro-

much wider spatial agendas of regional growth manage-

soft, Starbucks and Amazon, Seattle likes to think of

ment. This was apparent in a “Safe Haven” forum orga-

itself as top dog in the Pacific Northwest. But when

nized recently by the University of Washington, Tacoma

it comes to liveability we seem stuck in first gear. […]

and Pierce County Planning and Land Services. [Footnote

Just ask around. “I think Seattle’s in big trouble,” says

3] During the forum, citizens-volunteers involved in plan-

Gordon Price, a city councilor in Vancouver. “There’s

ning elaborated on their perceptions of the overall pro-

no fallback except having to live with congestion”

cess. One volunteer noted she was from the mental health

(Dietrich 2/3/02).
Notwithstanding the journalistic hype, the concern that
“Seattle’s in big trouble” directly challenges external
assumptions about Puget Sound. One of these assumptions is that, in the governance arena, the region has
a “progressive model” from which others might learn.
The reasoning is three-fold. First, as a result of the
1991Growth Management Act (GMA), Puget Sound’s
counties and municipals have all successfully drafted
comprehensive development plans. These plans will reinforce existing activity centres, and thus help to implode

[Footnote 3]
This forum, moderated by the Director of the Urban Studies
program at the University of Washington, Tacoma, was held on
the evening on February 13, 2003. The purpose of the forum
was to unpack the difficulties associated with municipal-County
relations. At a working lunch held before the forum, the Director of Planning for Pierce County wondered how to reduce
conflict. I suggested that, given the development models we
have, conflict is unavoidable -- why not start with the presumption of conflict? The Director responded this way: “I have never
thought about approaching things like that before; perhaps
you are right – perhaps that’s the right way to go about getting
through this.”

growth within the region’s urban growth boundary – “the
ring around the region” celebrated by Planning. Second,
Puget Sound has formed a four-county regional transit
authority – SoundTransit – that will inexorably reinforce
new development within this “ring” and wean the region
off the automobile Third, regional management is formally
abetted by the Puget Sound Regional Council, a council of
governments that brokers information and provide institutional coordination between jurisdictions. However, there
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field, “which has proven useful.” Another reported that he

Sound’s hidden “Achilles heal.” Indeed, they ultimately

had long experience in public issues but “there was a little

argue that Puget Sound can only avoid “Los Angelization”

less room for maneuver than we all thought.” Still another

– the spatial specter that seems to haunt both Puget Sound

noted that she felt most disappointed “anytime we had to

and Cape Town -- if “… the concept of Cascadia evolves

deal with other jurisdictions.” An elderly woman concurred

into a physical and economic reality” (p. 133).

and added that, though the process kept her hopeful, “I’m
not convinced we’re building a real community here.”

Why, then, is the region “stuck in first gear”? Why is the

Finally, the forum received a thoughtful denouement: “This

re-scaling opportunity stalled? While such questions de-

kind of planning,” the participant intoned, “is new in our

serve a great deal more thought – and empirical evidence

history. It’s antithetical to our American values – to our

-- than I can provide here, one hypothesis does seem to

rugged individualism. But we have to think about the Earth

fit the facts: Puget Sound is in trouble because most of its

itself.”

communities have adopted Friedmann’s “city-marketing”
model of urban development, where wealth is “invited in”

Second, and related to the first point, Puget Sound has
proved profoundly unable (so far) to wean itself off the
private automobile; in consequence, it has the third worst
congestion problems in the country. About 65% of individuals work outside the community in which they live. Yet
efforts to promote regional transportation confront political
parochialism and pro-car initiatives almost daily. To cite
but one example, officials in Renton, an important community in Puget Sound, stalled the sale of a small parcel
appraised at only $30,000 to Burlington Northern Santa
Fe Railway in June 2002. The railway, whose tracks carry
the “Sounder” commuter trains between Tacoma and Seattle, needed the land for safety improvements. The Mayor
wanted the tax money for “local” issues.
Finally, and flowing out of the first two points, despite the
urgent need to construct a supra-local political identity,
to embrace the Geddes/Mumford tradition of regionalism outlined earlier in this paper, municipal incorporations
have actually increased in the 1990s, the putative decade
of regional growth management! Indeed, new “cities” – if that is the right term -- appear almost every year,

through strategies for global “competitiveness” and “entrepreneurial” governance. On this reading, it is unsurprising
that Puget Sound as a whole labours to construct sustainable regionalism with unsustainable neoliberal tools. By
emphasising “competitiveness” in particular it undermines
the rationalities of “collaboration” – and ultimately of the
new communities of affection that Friedmann’s “quasi-city
state” model demands. The question, then, is not whether
“Cascadia evolves into a physical and economic reality.”
In fact, that has already happened, partly for the reasons
Alan Scott et al. have begun to elaborate. The question
is whether a new political reality – a re-scaled progressive regionalism -- can “grow over” and successfully
govern this physical and economic reality. It is precisely
here, I shall positively argue, that Puget Sound might look
to post-apartheid Cape Town for interesting lessons. But
Cape Town itself struggles with the spatial manifestations
of competitive neo-liberalism. Here too there is a lesson
, although it is hardly a positive one. Two lessons, then:
one negative and one positive. Let me conclude the paper
with a brief elaboration of these lessons, using Cape Town
emerging spatialities as the platform for this discussion.

even though “…the proliferation of jurisdictions …greatly
complicates regional management as intended by the

Learning from Cape Town’s spatialities?

plans” (Moudon and Heckmann 2000). More, these new
(suburban) “cities” often occlude affordable housing goals
through exclusionary zoning practices, which Moudon and
Heckman (Moudon and Heckmann 2000) identify as Puget
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Located near the Cape of Good Hope, alongside the
place-defining majesty of Table Mountain, “Cape Town”
might also be conceived as one of South Africa’s three
(global?) city-regions (Simmons and Hack 2000): 5).
Today it is home to about three million people, the majority of whom are identified locally as Coloured rather than
African, Indian/Asian or white. Built up like Puget Sound
from an original maritime function, Cape Town’s geography nonetheless mostly reflects (1) apartheid; and (2)
economic globalisation, particularly global tourism. Map
1 below charts a few of the “spaces” of Cape Town as an
emerging city-region. We need not “sugar-coat” this (partial) mapping. For the majority of Cape Town’s residents
still live in what might be called the space of apartheid
under-development. This space developed originally from
the practices attending urban agglomeration, modernist planning and, of course, apartheid ideology itself. In
geographical terms, dramatic “buffer zones” separate lowdensity, poverty-ridden, housing tracts that are, in turn, located far away from major employment centres (including
the CBD, Claremont and Belville employment “cores”). African areas within apartheid space, which were supposed
to “whither away” with the promulgation of the Coloured
Labour Preference Area in 1955, simply “wedged through”
the region, spreading towards the Southeast in ever-larger
residential swaths punctuated today by “squatterscapes” in
various stages of consolidation.
The burgeoning informality of its political, economic and
physical structure undoubtedly constitutes Cape Town
most daunting long-term challenge, a reality that needs a
great deal more research in the coming years (Dierwechter
2002; 2003). As (Jenkins and Wilkinson 2001) conclude
in their recent discussion of this challenge:
In the final analysis…it is probable that Cape Town
will continue to remain divided into two zones: one of

While the “informal societal order” may (or may not) be
a local example of Friedmann’s “urban backwaters,” the
“economic opportunity” Jenkins and Wilson refer to is
tied directly to Cape Town’s latest articulation with global
circuits of wealth creation, especially tourist circuits. The
ornamentation of Cape Town’s waterfront – its dramatic
re-production as “leisure space” -- is the most celebrated
example of this articulation (Kilian and Dodson 1996;
Goudie, Khan et al. 1999). But there are other examples
too, including new gambling zones and the “theme-ocentric” amusement/business complex at Century City/
Ratanga Junction just off the N1 (Hannigan 1998). The
latter is a special type of Hall’s “edge space,” the majority
of which is far less spectacular commercial development
that, according to Vanessa Watson (Watson 2000), has
decentralized rapidly in recent years from the three historic
cores, including the CBD core. Much of this has mutated
into “gated space,” joining an even greater number of
gated residential areas. For many, this new privatopia and
surveillance space suggests that Cape Town is emerging
as a “fortress city,” much like Los Angeles or Sao Paolo
(Robins 2002).
This last point runs the grave epistemological risk of any
mapping exercise (like the above one) that isolates similar
spaces – global spaces, backwater spaces, edge space,
leisure spaces, fortress spaces – and then over-generalizes
their meaning for a whole city. Amin and Graham (1997)
call this the problem of synecdoche – of taking the part to
represent the whole. At the same time, the simultaneous
emergence of these spaces – which no geographer can
possibly ignore -- also provides the basis for our first lesson. It is not a positive lesson, but it is, I hope, instructive
all the same. This lesson relates to the serious limitations of
the neo-liberal city-marketing model of urban development
that, I suggested earlier, Puget Sound is also following.

relative wealth and formal economic opportunity and
one of relative poverty, where the informal societal
order prevails (p._ ).
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Cape Town’s emerging spatialities dramatize these lessons,

tions not neoliberal imperfections. But if it turns out that we

holding them out for others to see in fairly stark form:

really do need a flatter geopolitics of global development

didactic, raw, open. Simply put, this spatiality reflects a

then Cape Town’s spatialities become highly instructive

house divided: one oriented towards global modernity,

for ALL city-regions vigorously pursuing the geography

the other towards apartheid under-development. Fortress

of external growth and competitive development. Puget

space emerges as a hopelessly unsustainable “solution” –

Sound does not have informal squatter camps; it does not

a Mason-Dixon line that staves off the quiet desperation

have the awesome spatial legacies of apartheid ideology.

of a civil war between two incompatible socio-economic

However, it does have its own zones of poverty and despair – often in the immediate shadow of its own “themeo-centric” cathedrals of leisure and consumption; it has its
own proliferating Edge and Fortress cities and its own gun
problem. In this sense it well might look South – to Cape
Town -- for images of its own neo-liberal future: a house
divided that, to stay with the Lincolnian metaphor, cannot
long stand.
Yet we cannot end things there. For there is, I would also
argue, another epistemology of post-apartheid Cape
Town, one that does not over-generalize the dualities
of global modernity and apartheid under-development,
however important these two realities may be to the story

[Map 1]
“Spaces” of the city-region Cape Town

systems. On this reading, and following David Harvey’s
famous analysis of entrepreneurial governance, the territorial alliances of a re-scaled Cape Town – appropriately
re-GEARed -- are over-enthusiastic about exogenous
development, over-obsessed with the global modernity
of mobile capitalism, delusional that this modernity will
diffuse into (rather than rely upon) the space of apartheid
under-development, over convinced that the “North’s”
mode of production will eventually win out, however horrific and costly the battle.
Puget Sound can only dismiss these realities by relying on

of this city. It is hard to draw maps with this “other”
epistemology because, as Jenny Robinson suggests, it lies
somewhere “between” modernity and development – perhaps in the radical “spaces of representation” that Lefebvre
(1991) envisaged. But we can try to locate these spaces
as best we can, perhaps using traditions of urban thought
neglected in recent years, such as those associated with
Geddes and Mumford detailed earlier. When we do so, I
think Puget Sound might draw much more positive lessons
from Cape Town’s recent experimentations, especially its
political experimentations. For above all else, Cape Town
has re-scaled its governance structures – and with utterly
remarkable, perhaps unprecedented, speed (Cameron
1999).4 Unlike Puget Sound, which suffers from local
institutional chaos, Cape Town has created a single gover-

a severely out-dated geopolitical imagination of global development, one that tosses Cape Town into the irrelevant
abyss of the “Third World.” So done, Cape Town’s spatialities of urban neoliberalism are “Third World” imperfec-
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nance realm for the negotiation of its future urban devel-

politics. Following the synoptic theme of this session –

opment trajectory – for placed-based collaboration about

“Learning from South Africa” – I have argued here that

the endogenous assets that might be deployed for a more

“Puget Sound” might look to “Cape Town’s” spatialities for

sustainable tomorrow.

strategic insight into such politics. I initially mobilized Alan
Scott’s (geopolitical) argument that we pay more attention

This new realm of city-regional governance -- where ad-

to global city-regions, suggesting that such regions change

ministrative and economic spaces “match up” -- guaran-

the direction of spatial learning by confronting the “core-

tees nothing in itself. We need to be clear-eyed about this.

periphery” spatialities of world history. I then elaborated

City-regionalism is not genetically “progressive.” As many

upon the geography of city-regions, drawing not only upon

scholars have argued of late, the city-region is a socially

the current literature but also upon an older tradition of ur-

constructed scale – and thus reproductive of the groups

ban thought that stretches back to the neo-anarchistic re-

who do the constructing (Brenner 2002). But Cape Town

gionalism of Lewis Mumford and Patrick Geddes. I pulled

has made a start – and it is already possible to see the po-

these two literatures together by referencing John Friedma-

tentialities of its new governance structure. It has abetted

nn’s propositions about urban development models -- the

innovative projects like the Wetton-Landsdowne-Corridor,

first neo-liberal, the second regionalist. Through a spatial

which Roberts (2002) rightly calls “people-centred space”

exploration of Puget Sound and Cape Town, respectively,

and which might also be theorised as a politically-induced

I subsequently used these models to highlight two lessons

representation of socio-spatial integration. Within this

for Puget Sound. The first was negative, as it addressed the

wider field of action there are even smaller, more ordinary,

divided spatialities of Cape Town’s urban neoliberalism;

less flashy spaces – for example, spaces of informal sector

the second was positive, finding inspiration in Cape Town’s

development -- that drip with the endogenous, collabora-

remarkable political transformation, which, in my view, still

tive and sustainable potential of the “quasi-city-state” strat-

retains the spatial possibilities for endogenous, collabora-

egies Friedmann celebrates (Dierwechter 2001, 2003).

tive and sustainable city-regions.

And again, while Puget Sound does not have large swaths
of “informality,” it does have its own distinctive zones of
neglected people and ignored assets. Accordingly, in so
far as Puget Sound must engage with these zones if it is to
build a just city-region, it may turn to Cape Town for political inspiration. For however submerged and precarious,
Cape Town’s city-regionalism still retains the potential for
something organic and true, rather than something imported and imitative.

Conclusions
In the headquote that opened this paper, I highlighted
an ordinary, but stinging, critique of Puget Sound’s political and administrative geographies. If life does not
improve in the region, we can expect such critiques may
grow – perhaps enough to generate a different kind of
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